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Wai Yee Wan, Christopher Chen, Say Goo 
 
 
Abstract  Current scholarship emphasises the correlation between enforcement of corporate and 
securities laws and strong capital markets. Yet, the issue of how private and public enforcement 
may achieve the objectives of compensation and optimal deterrence remains controversial. While 
enforcement strategies have been studied extensively in the US and the UK, comparatively less 
attention is placed on Asia where concentrated shareholdings are the norm. This study fills the gap 
by focusing on Hong Kong and Singapore, two leading international financial centres in Asia. 
Post-Asian financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong and Singapore have changed their laws to 
strengthen the private enforcement framework. Public enforcement activities have also been 
significant. The question is whether these reforms and enforcement activities succeed in reaching 
the afore-mentioned objectives. Based on our study of breaches of directorial duties and corporate 
disclosure violations involving listed companies from 2000 to 2015, we find that (1) public 
enforcement dominates over private enforcement; and (2) there exist important, but limited, 
substitutes to private enforcement: securities regulators use public enforcement to obtain 
compensation for investors and shareholders file requisitions to remove the errant directors. We 
argue that: (a) there is a significant gap in enforcement strategies for directorial wrongdoing in 
Singapore; (b) for public enforcement of corporate disclosure violations, the beneficiaries of the 
compensation should be the investors (rather than the company) and the defendants should only 
be the errant directors (and not the company). Our study is relevant to those jurisdictions 
considering the powers of regulators and improving their enforcement framework.  
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1 Introduction 
 
A great deal of attention has been placed in recent scholarship on how intensely corporate 
governance rules in the world are enforced.1 The choice in any given jurisdiction on the optimal 
manner of enforcement, whether by public agencies or private investor and whether through civil, 
criminal or hybrid means, is important as the level of enforcement is now increasingly viewed as 
vital in achieving deterrence and investor compensation, which are essential in promoting deep 
and liquid securities markets.2 Proponents of private enforcement of corporate and securities laws, 
particularly, La Porta et al, have argued, pointing to the United States (US), that empowering 
investors to bring action against defendants engaged in market misconduct is associated with 
strong securities markets.3  Others have argued that the measure of shareholder litigation is not 
meaningful and that public enforcement is a much more significant contributor, pointing to the 
United Kingdom (UK).4  
A limitation of the current scholarship on enforcement is that it is mainly focused on 
the Western jurisdictions (particularly in the US and the UK) which are characterised by markets 
with diffused shareholdings among their publicly listed companies, whose main aims are to 
address the agency costs that exist between managers and the shareholders. 5  Some of the 
scholarship focuses on the European Union (EU) more broadly and on countries such as Australia.6 
In contrast, there are few studies on enforcement in jurisdictions with concentrated shareholdings 
in Asia, where, outside of Japan, the main concerns of agency costs are between the controlling 
and minority shareholders and the challenge is to find the appropriate strategy to control these 
costs.  
In this paper, we examine the enforcement strategies in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
which are two international financial centres in Asia and which rank highly in protection of 
minority rights and enforcement scores in international rankings. 7 Hong Kong and Singapore are 
good choices to study as their publicly listed companies 8  are dominated by concentrated 
shareholdings. 9  Both are common law jurisdictions with strong judiciary and have highly 
                                                          
 
1  See, e.g., Coffee JC Jr. (2007); Jackson HE and Roe MJ (2009); La Porta R et al. (2006); Armour J et al. 
(2009). 
2  See La Porta R et al. (2006), ibid.    
3  See La Porta R et al. (2006), ibid.  
4  See Armour J et al. (2009). 
5  For diffusion and concentration of shareholdings of major Western and Asian jurisdictions, see La Porta R 
et al. (1999). However, in both the US and UK, not all the companies have diffused ownership and there are publicly 
listed companies with blockholders. See e.g. Holderness CG (2009) (for US) and Reddy BV (2017) (giving UK 
examples).  
6  E.g. see the literature cited Enriques L et al. (2017), pp. 261-262 (for France, Germany and the UK); see 
Hedges J et al. (2016); Gilligan G et al. (2015) (for Australia).  
7  CLSA, CG Watch 2016 (Singapore and Hong Kong scoring 63 and 69 respectively for enforcement, which 
are the highest among the Asian jurisdictions. In comparison, Australia scores 68.). See also World Bank, Doing 
Business 2017: Hong Kong and Doing Business 2017: Singapore, on protecting minority investors, available at 
www.doingbusiness.org (accessed 1 September 2017).   
8  As at December 2015, Hong Kong and Singapore have 1886 and 769 companies listed on their respective 
stock exchanges. Source: World Federation of Exchanges. 
9  For evidence of concentration of shareholdings in Singapore, see Chen C et al. (2017) (based on a sample of 
103 SGX-listed companies, the data shows approximately 66% of the Singapore companies have beneficial owners 
over 30% and 87%). For Hong Kong, see Carney RW and Child TB (2013) (based on a sample of 158 SEHK-listed 
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developed stock markets. Both also have significant proportions of foreign listings in their stock 
markets.10 Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, both jurisdictions also seek to strengthen the 
private enforcement framework. In Singapore, the statutory compensation scheme for market 
misconduct was introduced in 2002 via the Securities and Futures Act (SFA). In 2013, Singapore 
liberalised the availability of the statutory compensation scheme, which makes it easier to obtain 
compensation for corporate disclosure violation by removing the ceiling of recovery.11 In 2014, 
the statutory derivative action was extended to listed companies incorporated in Singapore.12 In 
Hong Kong, since 2004, the statutory derivative action allows shareholders to pursue corporate 
claims against corporate insiders, even when the insiders did not wish to bring such claims.13  In 
both jurisdictions, the objective of the strengthening of the private enforcement framework is 
stated to increase investor protection, which is seen as vital for strong securities markets.14 
While there are single study jurisdictions examining various aspects of enforcement in 
Hong Kong15 and Singapore,16 and more recently, a comparative study on shareholder derivative 
actions,17 these studies present aggregated data of public and/or private enforcement separately. 
This paper presents a new dataset on Hong Kong and Singapore enforcement data on directorial 
misconduct and corporate disclosure violations, by examining each instance of private (and 
concurrent/subsequent public) or public (and concurrent/subsequent private) enforcement action, 
the defendants that are pursued, the outcomes of these actions (including sanctions imposed, the 
beneficiaries of compensation) and the length of time that the proceedings took to resolve . This 
paper also presents new evidence on the existence of an important functional equivalent of private 
enforcement, that is, shareholder requisitions on resolutions linked to governance failures.18 In 
sum, our study presents a richer account on how public and private enforcement works in the two 
countries.  
We seek to answer the following questions. First, how robust is private and public 
enforcement of corporate and securities laws in Hong Kong and Singapore? Such enforcement is 
vital to the functioning and integrity of securities market. We are particularly interested in what 
has been the impact, on investor compensation, of legislation in both countries that seek to 
strengthen private investor action in the enforcement of directorial duties and corporate 
disclosures,19 and whether there are any gaps in the enforcement strategies. Second, are there any 
functional substitutes to private enforcement by shareholders? The answers to the first and second 
                                                          
companies, the data shows 55.1% are controlled by families (controlling at least 20%) and 27.2 are controlled by state 
(controlling at 20%). 
10  As at  31 December 2015, Hong Kong and Singapore have 1770 (out of 1886 or 94%) and 286 (out of 769 
or 37%) companies respectively listed outside the jurisdiction of listing. Source: World Federation of Exchanges.  
11  Securities and Futures (Amendment) Act 2012, discussed in Wan WY and U Varottil (2013).  
12  Companies (Amendment) Act 2014 (Act 36 of 2014) s 146 (Singapore), removing the definition of “company” 
in Companies Act s 216A(1) that limited the application of derivative action to unlisted companies. 
13  Companies Ordinance, ss 732 and 733. 
14  Monetary Authority of Singapore (1998) Report of the Corporate Finance Committee: The Securities Market 
Final Recommendations; Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (2002) Consultation Paper on Proposed 
Amendments to the Listing Rules Relating to Corporate Governance Issues. 
15  Donald DC and Cheuk P (2017); Chan GYM (2014); Mezanotte FE (2017). 
16  Wan WY (2008). 
17  S Tang, ‘Rethinking the ‘Theory in Books’ for Derivative Actions: Evidence from Singapore and Hong 
Kong’, on file with authors.   
18  For substitutes to private enforcement in the UK, see Armour J et al. (2009).  
19  It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the appropriate ex ante regulation to secure compliance. For 
a discussion on ex ante regulation in Hong Kong, see GYM Chan (2014).  
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questions will enable us to formulate the appropriate policy recommendations for reforms on the 
enforcement framework.   
 
We focus on two kinds of misconduct which pose the greatest challenges to the 
securities markets and where there can be both public and private enforcement in corporate and 
securities laws in Hong Kong and Singapore: corporate disclosure violations and breaches of 
directorial duties. We have not included insider dealing, market manipulation or use of fraudulent 
or deceptive devices in this study as they can be carried out not only by corporate insiders but also 
by third parties and do not often involve harm to the listed company. We have also excluded 
liability when the company is trading while insolvent. We refer to public enforcement as 
enforcement that is initiated by government actors, such as securities regulators, public prosecutors 
and private organization with quasi-public functions such as stock exchanges. For example, we 
regard reprimands made, and remedial actions required, by stock exchanges as part of public 
enforcement. Private enforcement refers to actions that are initiated by private parties acting in 
their own interests.20 
On enforcement of directorial duties, our data shows that private enforcement by 
shareholders (in the form of derivative actions) is very rare in both countries. If there is private 
enforcement, it is left mostly to the company directors and/or liquidators. In particular, in 
Singapore, despite the extension of the statutory derivative claims for listed companies 
incorporated in Singapore  in 2014, such claims are rare, with only one case.21 Public enforcement 
is far more significant in both countries. In Singapore, public enforcement is exercised through 
criminal prosecution.  In Hong Kong, public enforcement is carried out by the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC).22   
On the enforcement of corporate disclosure, there are small but important differences 
in the approaches that Hong Kong and Singapore have undertaken. While the securities legislation 
in both countries provide for compensation for disclosure violations, in Hong Kong, the securities 
regulator has wide-ranging powers under the public enforcement framework not only to punish the 
wrongdoers but also to recover compensation for aggrieved investors.23 In Singapore, such powers 
of recovering compensation are not explicitly conferred on the regulator but the legislation on the 
“books” has a statutory compensation scheme, which is comparatively more favourable to 
investors seeking to enforce corporate disclosure violations than at common law.24 However, 
despite the measures to improve the availability of investors to access private enforcement, public 
enforcement of corporate disclosure laws is more prevalent than private enforcement in both 
countries. In Hong Kong, private enforcement by investors is low but the gap is partially filled by 
public enforcement obtaining substantial compensation for investors in selected cases. In 
Singapore, while the securities legislation “on the books” allows investor claims, civil claims 
continue to be very rare. However, there is an avenue of using indirect compensation through the 
                                                          
20  Our definitions of public and private enforcement follows of Armour J et al. (2017), ch 2.  
21  See discussion in n 83 and accompanying text. 
22  See discussion in Section 2.5.2 below. 
23  See discussion in Section 2.5.3 below. 
24  Ibid. 
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creative use of the settlement process in public enforcement, which has been used recently by the 
securities regulator.  
Investor compensation for corporate disclosure violations also prompt the further 
question: who should be the beneficiaries and defendants of these enforcement actions? In these 
cases, the errant directors would have made the statements on behalf of the listed firms, so, in 
theory (and subject to the requisite intention), both of the errant directors and the listed firms could 
be held liable criminally or civilly. Here, we find that there are small but significant differences in 
law in action in Hong Kong and Singapore. In Hong Kong, both the listed firms and the errant 
directors or officials are subject to stock exchange criticisms and substantial civil pecuniary orders 
for disclosure violations. In particular, SFC, more often than not, seeks to hold both of the listed 
firm and the directors or officials liable to compensate the investors who suffer losses.25 When the 
listed firm is liable, it raises the circularity problem in securities litigation, which refers to the fact 
that innocent existing shareholders who did not contribute to the securities fraud bear the costs of 
compensation to the investors who lost value. In Singapore, while both the listed firms and the 
directors are subject to stock exchange criticisms, the trend shows that only the directors and 
officials are subject to civil pecuniary orders and/or prosecution.  Further, the beneficiaries of 
compensation are the listed firm itself, rather than the investors.  
Our findings for Hong Kong and Singapore on the state of private enforcement prompt 
the further question, that is, are there substitutes for private enforcement (apart from shareholder 
litigation or investor action)? We find that significant minority shareholders do use the mechanism 
of reputational sanction, by requisitioning shareholder requisitions to remove the errant directors 
or voice their unhappiness with governance failures.  
We then discuss the normative implications of our study on achieving the twin goals 
of investor compensation and optimal deterrence. First, it is likely that private enforcement will 
remain rare, given the procedural problems such as the costs, lack of an active plaintiffs’ attorney 
bar, the difficulties of obtaining discovery and the free-rider problem. Thus, in Singapore, we argue 
that there is a case for the securities regulator to enforce such breaches of directorial duties given 
that the existing regulatory strategies only relate to imposing criminal sanctions and shareholder-
initiated derivative actions for compensation are rare. The availability of civil sanctions will also 
increase the regulatory toolkit that the securities regulator has and incentivises wrongdoing 
directors to negotiate a compensation settlement with the listed company. Second, on individual 
or corporate claims and/or liability for corporate disclosure violations, we argue that investor 
compensation and optimal deterrence should be the goals for civil non-penalty liability and 
criminal/ civil penalty respectively. Thus, in the case of Singapore, where the defendants enter into 
consent orders and offers to pay compensation, the proper beneficiaries should be the investors 
who suffered loss, and not the company. Greater consideration should also be made to impose 
criminal and/or civil penalties on the listed companies. In the case of Hong Kong, in the securities 
regulator’s enforcement actions, only the wrongdoing directors (as distinct from the listed 
companies) should be obligated to pay compensation.  
More generally, our study not only contributes to the debate on the theory of private 
enforcement by La Porta et al,26 but also to the other major theoretical debate in corporate law on 
                                                          
25  See the discussion relating to the enforcement proceedings on CITIC, n 104 and accompanying text. 
26  La Porta R et al. (2006). 
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legal transplantation. We also demonstrate that the transplantation of US-driven paradigm of the 
primacy of private enforcement of securities litigation may not have the effects  found in the 
country of origin. Our research will be of interest to jurisdictions seeking to improve the powers 
of the regulators or their enforcement framework.  
There are certain limitations to our study. First, our study focuses only on the formal 
enforcement. As the literature has pointed out in the context of the UK, informal enforcement 
(such as behind the scenes consultations with the regulators) is important.27 However, informal 
enforcement is not readily observable in Hong Kong and Singapore except with in-depth 
interviews with the regulators and practitioners, which will have to be the subject of separate 
research. Second, we can only investigate those enforcement actions reported by the listed firms 
or the media or in the form of judgments issued by the courts. We are not able to study any private 
settlement with individual investors or private reprimands given by the regulators. Third, we are 
not able to say based on our study whether Hong Kong and Singapore have reached optimal levels 
in respect of public enforcement; a low volume of enforcement is ambiguous because it can 
indicate an ineffective regulator or a clean market and conversely a high volume of enforcement 
can indicate an effective regulator or a rigged market.28 However, we can, and do, point out gaps 
in the enforcement strategies when we compare and contrast these strategies in the two countries, 
with reference to the US and the UK.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 of this paper examines the 
theoretical framework of enforcement. Section 3 presents data on enforcement of corporate 
disclosure violations and breaches of directorial duties and explains how the gaps in private 
enforcement have been partially filled by the securities regulator taking enforcement actions to 
obtain investor compensation. Section 4 examines the availability of other functional substitutes 
for private enforcement. Section 5 sets out the lessons and normative implications and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review and the Theoretical Framework of Enforcement 
 
2.1 Literature review and objectives of effective enforcement 
 
To assess the intensity of enforcement of corporate and securities laws, that is, law in “action”, 
scholars have measured the exercise of regulatory discretions and oversight of public capital 
markets by using various proxies, including the proportion of the budget spent on enforcement29 
and relationship between the budget and staffing numbers of the enforcement agency.30 However, 
the chief limitation of using the above-mentioned ‘inputs’ data is that the securities regulators in 
Hong Kong and Singapore generally aggregate the data for financial services generally and do not 
disclose the proportion spent actually on enforcement of securities misconduct in their budget and 
staffing numbers. While the former Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK has collected 
                                                          
27  Armour J (2008). 
28  Jackson HE and Roe MJ (2009). 
29  Coffee JC Jr. (2007). 
30  Jackson HE and Roe MJ (2009). 
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and published data relating to enforcement of securities markets obtained from the Singapore and 
Hong Kong regulators directly, the last collection (and publication) was in 2006. 31 Since that date, 
there have been significant developments to the securities markets in both countries, including the 
influx of listing of mainland Chinese firms,32 as well as rise in demand for enforcement services.33 
Thus, instead of looking at how public regulators exercise the resources allocated to 
them, we measure intensity through ‘output’ in the form of public enforcement by regulators and 
private enforcement by the listed companies and their shareholders.  By looking at a number of 
factors, including number of actions and the outcomes of these actions, we can draw certain cross-
country comparisons as to enforcement intensity and what both countries can learn from each 
other.  
Our findings contribute to the existing literature relating to enforcement in Hong Kong 
and Singapore in the following ways. First, Donald’s Hong Kong data for the period 2006 to 2012 
shows that the public enforcement of corporate and securities laws is much more central than 
private enforcement.34 In a closely related study, Donald and Cheuk have examined an updated 
dataset containing the public enforcement strategies of the Hong Kong regulators using the 
aggregate data of enforcement actions.35 Our study differs from these two earlier studies in that we 
examine the circumstances surrounding each reported case of corporate disclosure violation and/or 
breach of directorial duties and then trace the outcome (whether it takes the form of sanction, 
remedies or delisting). In this way, we can trace whether there has been both public and private 
enforcement for the same listed company and/or its directors. Our study enables us to determine 
whether the mix of enforcement strategies (both private and public) are adequate in the 
circumstances. Second, our study adds to the study by Mezanotte on statutory derivative action in 
Hong Kong, in that we additionally cover oppression actions, which have their foundations on 
unfair conduct by controlling shareholders (who are usually either directors themselves or are able 
control the appointment of directors).36 Third, in prior work, Wan finds that shareholder litigation 
for corporate disclosure violation is generally rare in Singapore, based on the data available prior 
to 2008.37 This study extends the study to oppression actions and breaches of directorial duties and 
                                                          
31  The Financial Services Authority in the UK had collected data from ten jurisdictions (including  Singapore 
(MAS) and Hong Kong (SFC)) as to the amounts that were allocated to securities enforcement and publicly disclosed 
such data, but the latest was as at 2006. See FSA, Annual Report 2006, Appendix 1 (Cost of Regulatory Authorities 
in other Jurisdictions). The data from an earlier study of the FSA, Annual Report 2004, was used as the basis of the 
study done by Jackson HE (2007) and Jackson HE and Roe MJ (2009). 
32  For example, in Hong Kong, as at 2005, 18.5% of the Mainboard listed companies on SEHK were mainland 
Chinese firms, constituting 48% of the aggregate market capitalisation of all Mainboard listed companies. By 2015, 
53.8% of the Mainland listed companies on SHEK were mainland Chinese firms constituting 63.7% of the aggregate 
market capitalisation of all Mainboard listed companies. Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (2006) 
HKEX Fact Book; Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (2016) HKEX Fact Book 2016. In Singapore, 
mainland Chinese companies constituted approximately 7.2% of all of the listed SGX firms in 2004 and the figure 
rose to 20% by 2011: source: Reuters Staff (2011) (reporting 41  mainland Chinese firms in 2014), J Kwok, ‘Are S-
chips still a possible play?’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 25 December 2011), and calculations from World Federation 
of Exchanges.    
33  Lam A (2017), ch 17 (describing the between 2007 and 2014, the investigation workload increased by 240% 
and litigation work increased by over 500%). 
34  Donald DC (2013), ch 5.  
35  Donald DC and Cheuk P (2017).  
36  Mezanotte FE (2017). 
37  Wan WY and Varottil U (2013), ch 16. 
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updates the dataset to 2015. It also covers the cases involving significant regulatory actions taken 
post-2008.  
2.2 Public enforcement by regulators 
 
For publicly listed companies with concentrated shareholdings, the biggest corporate challenges 
are the misconduct by directors, who are often appointed by the controlling shareholders. An active 
enforcement by regulators can not only deter market misconduct but also carry many advantages, 
including obtaining investor compensation. For example, in certain jurisdictions, such as 
Australia, 38  the regulator is expressly conferred powers to commence litigation to obtain 
compensation for the listed company and/or the investors. In the UK, the regulator has the express 
power to order restitution for market abuse and has recently exercised such power in favour of the 
investors of Tesco.39 In the US, there exists the “fair fund” which allows the SEC to designate civil 
penalties recovered to benefit defrauded private investors.40 In Section 3 below, we demonstrate 
how the securities regulator in Hong Kong and Singapore have used the powers under the securities 
laws to obtain investor compensation.  
Allowing the regulator to have a range of possible sanctions which can be imposed on 
the wrongdoers gives the flexibility to calibrate the severity of the sanction to the misconduct, in 
a way that compensatory damages will be unable to do so. For example, many jurisdictions provide 
not only for criminal sanctions for wrongdoing but also civil penalty orders which carry a lower 
burden of proof and yet can be set at appropriate levels for both deterring the particular defendant 
and the public at large.41 In Australia, the civil penalty framework has allowed the regulators to 
set the standards for boardroom behaviour in duty of care cases; for instance, in the Centro case, 
the outcome of the decision required directors (including non-executive directors) to read and 
comprehend the accounts before they give their opinion. At the same time, the decision imposed a 
relatively light civil penalty for contravention, so as not to risk over-deterring directorial conduct.42 
Additionally, directorial disqualification may be imposed to remove unsuitable 
directors from assuming offices. In less serious cases, a public reprimand or warning, coupled with 
undertakings by the listed company or its directors to change their conduct, may be sufficient. In 
                                                          
38  ASIC Act, s 50. See Bentley N (2016). 
39  FSMA, s 384; the power was exercised recently in connection with the false or misleading statement by 
Tesco. See Financial Conduct Authority (2017) Final Notice: Tesco plc and Tesco Stores Limited. 
40  Sarbanes Oxley Act, s 308; see discussion in Velikonia U (2015); Cox JD and Thomas RS (2003). 
41  Eg Hedges et al (2017) (for Australia). 
42  ASIC v Healey [2011] FCA 717. In that case, errors were found in the 2007 annual reports of Centro 
Properties Group (CNP) and Centro Retail Group (CER). In the case of CNP, the report failed to disclose some A$1.5 
billion of short-term liabilities as they were wrongly classified as non-current liabilities, and failed to disclose 
guarantees of short-term liabilities of an associated company of approximately US$1.75 billion that had been given 
after the balance sheet date. In the case of CER, the 2007 annual reports failed to disclose some A$500 million of 
short-term liabilities that had been classified as non-current. The audit committee and a major auditing firm had signed 
off on the accounts. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) brought enforcement proceedings 
against the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO) and the six non-executive directors. All of 
the directors were held to have contravened section 180 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (which sets out the 
statutory duty of care of directors). However, when it came to the penalties, the court imposed a fine of A$30 000 on 
Centro’s former CEO, and a two year managerial disqualification order on its former CFO. No penalties were imposed 
on the non-executive directors. 
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Section 3 below, we present evidence on how the securities regulators in Hong Kong and 
Singapore have utilised the range of sanctions to deter misconduct and identify some of the gaps 
in this respect.   
Further, the regulator usually would have wide-ranging powers of investigation, which 
can be used in ways that are not present in private enforcement. In Hong Kong and Singapore, 
where there is a high proportion of foreign listings, the regulator is more likely to be successful in 
seeking cross-border regulatory cooperation in investigation and gathering evidence, which is not 
available to private investors when they are seeking to bring actions against directors who are 
outside the jurisdiction of listing. The regulator is able to exercise its powers to send a signal to 
what it perceives to be in the public interest, which is not the case in private litigation, and 
overcome the collective action problem faced by shareholders in bringing private securities 
litigation.43 In certain situations, the regulator can through censures or reprimands, bring about a 
change in behaviour of the wrongdoing parties. 
The downside of primary reliance on public enforcement is, however, that it is dependent 
on the size of the regulator’s budget in enforcement. Where resources are scarce, as are often the 
case, the regulator is likely to choose enforcement cases which are relatively straightforward, 
where there is public interest (such as a high degree of publicity),44 and these actions are not 
necessarily in the investors’ interests. 
 
2.3 Private Enforcement  
 
For the limitations mentioned in the preceding section, public enforcement cannot be the sole 
means for regulating all of the breaches of directorial duties and corporate disclosure violation. 
Private enforcement is also necessary as explained below. For breaches of directorial duties, in 
theory, the boards of companies should be bringing these actions against the wrongdoing directors. 
In practice, however, these actions are usually brought only with newly constituted boards of 
directors or liquidators where there are company funds to pursue such litigation. If the boards do 
not take actions, the only options are for the shareholders to exercise private actions. In many 
common law jurisdictions, including the UK,45  Australia,46  Hong Kong and Singapore, 47 the 
companies’ legislation allows  shareholders of listed companies to compel the companies to bring 
the actions through the statutory derivative actions.  For corporate disclosure violations, due to the 
problems that claimants face when they sue the defendants at common law for false or misleading 
statements made to the securities markets,48 UK,49 Hong Kong and Singapore50 have enacted 
                                                          
43  The collective action problem exists because the costs of bringing the lawsuit are likely to be greater than 
shareholder claimant’s pro rata benefit.  
44  Eg see Cox JD and Thomas RS (2003) (in the context of the US Securities and Exchange Commission). 
45  Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 260-264.  
46  Corporations Act 2001 (Aust), Part 2F.1A (ss 236-242). 
47  See discussion in Section 2.5 below.  
48  See discussion in Wan WY (2009); Wan WY (2008); Paul Davies QC (2007). 
49  Ibid. 
50  See Appendix 2. 
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legislation to enable investors to obtain statutory compensation from the listed companies and/or 
their directors. 
Private enforcement by investors or shareholders (whether directly or in the form of 
derivative actions) carries a number of benefits. Not only are investors compensated for the 
damages resulting from the wrongdoing, it can operate to deter wrongdoing due to the threat of 
liability. There is a substantial body of literature that has argued that private parties have far better 
incentives to bring actions than do regulatory bodies, and are thus more effective in enforcement 
than public enforcers. 51 Likewise, it has been argued that private enforcement has contributed to 
a robust securities market in the US.52  
However, in many jurisdictions outside of the US, private enforcement does not 
address all of the investor compensation issues; smaller shareholders tend to suffer the collective 
action problem in listed companies, and typically are not interested in commencing litigation. The 
civil procedure rules play an important part as well, as a rule that requires the loser to pay the 
winner’s costs, coupled with a lack of an active plaintiff attorneys’ bar and securities class actions, 
will tend to discourage the smaller shareholders from bringing the action. Even when shareholders 
are willing to bring the actions, the availability of an optimal discovery mechanism is important to 
these shareholders.53  Thus, it remains an empirical question as to whether investors actually 
receive the appropriate compensation, notwithstanding the law “in the books”. 
 
2.4 Differences between breach of continuous disclosure obligations and breaches of 
directorial duties  
 
Breach of continuous disclosure obligations cases raise different enforcement issues from breaches 
of directorial duties in at least two aspects. First, there are at least two choices as to the beneficiaries 
of compensation in corporate disclosure violations: either the company or the investors. 
Proponents of the former view have argued that the corporate governance rationale should prevail 
and the fraud should be treated as fraud against the company; thus, the proper plaintiff should be 
the company, and there are creative ways to deal with issues of causation and remoteness.54 
Proponents of latter view have argued that the listed company usually would not have suffered any 
direct losses unless the disclosure violation is accompanied by breaches of directorial duties and 
the listed company had covered up such breaches. 55  In the absence of corporate disclosure 
violations not accompanied by directors’ breaches of duties, the losses are suffered by investors 
who have traded in the shares in ignorance of the contravention. Thus, in these cases, the parties 
who have suffered losses are the investors who bought into the company in ignorance of the bad 
news (and not the listed company).  
                                                          
51  Eg La Porta R et al. (2006). 
52  Ibid. 
53  Gorga E and Halbertam M (2014). 
54  Eg Tjio H (2009).  
55  Eg Wan (2008). 
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Second, and unlike breaches of directorial duties, the possible defendants for corporate disclosure 
violations, whether in a criminal, civil penalty or action for civil remedies, include both the listed 
firms and the investors. In criminal or civil penalty actions, the regulator can choose whether to 
proceed only against the individuals or against the listed company, even though the company is 
deemed to have committed the false or misleading disclosure or engaged in material non-
disclosure. It has been argued that from the perspectives of the companies and their managers, they 
would prefer criminal corporate liability because it deflects sanctions away from managers. 56 
Thus, for effective deterrence, liability should be imposed on the managers, rather than the 
companies. In our study, we seek to test the strategies of the securities regulator in Hong Kong and 
Singapore in preferring to impose criminal or administrative liabilities on companies or their 
directors. 
 
For civil actions, the solution for private securities litigation reached in the UK is that sellers and 
purchasers of securities can sue the listed company (but not directors) for fraudulent disclosures 
and delays in disclosures. 57 In the US, while sellers and purchasers have direct rights of actions 
against the listed company and directors58, in practice, only listed companies pay the damages and 
individual directors and officials do not end up paying. Compensation by the listed companies to 
the investors therefore raises the classic “circularity” problem, which refers to the fact that innocent 
existing investors who did not contribute to the securities fraud bear the costs of compensation to 
the investors who lost value.59 The circularity problem may be less pronounced in Hong Kong and 
Singapore where the vast majority of the public companies have concentrated shareholding. When 
the listed company is held liable for corporate disclosure violations (usually with the cognizance 
of the errant controlling shareholders), these errant controlling shareholders will also suffer since 
the value of their shareholding will also fall correspondingly. Nevertheless, the circularity problem 
is not eliminated as minority shareholders in the public companies, who are not privy to the 
wrongdoing, will also suffer a fall in the value of their shareholdings as a result of the 
compensation. Thus, this would suggest that it should be the errant directors who should be 
compensating the investors, and not the company. We seek to test whether this is in fact the case 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
2.5 Public Enforcement in Hong Kong and Singapore Markets 
 
2.5.1 Background and the enforcement authorities  
 
We begin with a measure of the listed companies and market capitalization in the two countries. 
Hong Kong and Singapore have an aggregate of 1,866 and 769 listed companies as at 2015.60 A 
                                                          
56  Khanna V (2004). 
57  FSMA, s 90A (allows purchasers of securities to sue the listed issuer for statutory compensation for 
fraudulent (not negligent) periodic misstatement). See Paul Davies QC (2007) at [18]. 
58  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, s 20(a). 
59  The circularity problem is discussed in Coffee JC (2006). Cf Fisch JE (2009).  
60  Statistics are obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges.  
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significant proportion of listed companies in the stock exchanges of two countries are foreign 
listings.61 Hong Kong’s market capitalisation is about five times that of Singapore’s (USD3,18 
billion (Hong Kong) and USD640,000 billion).  
The securities regulators in Hong Kong and Singapore are the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) respectively. The SFC and 
the MAS investigate breaches of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO)62 and the Securities 
and Futures Act (SFA)63 respectively and are able to institute proceedings for civil penalties 
against persons who have infringed the market misconduct provisions in the securities legislation 
of Hong Kong and Singapore respectively,64 including proceedings before the Market Misconduct 
Tribunal (MMT) (in Hong Kong).65  As to criminal proceedings, in Hong Kong, the SFC is able 
to bring criminal prosecutions in the Magistrate’s courts, with the Department of Justice bringing 
more serious cases in the District Courts and Courts of First Instance.66 In Singapore, criminal 
investigations relating to market misconduct and breaches of directorial duties can also be jointly 
conducted by the Commercial Affairs Department and the MAS, and criminal prosecutions are 
brought by the Attorney-General’s Chambers in the name of Public Prosecutor.  
Additionally, we should also mention the role of the stock exchanges, which has the 
role of investigating and taking disciplinary action against the issuers and their directors if there is 
a breach of the listing rules, including those relating to failing to act in the interests of the company 
as a whole and/or its shareholders (in the case of Hong Kong).67 In the case of SEHK, the SEHK 
is able to impose a range of sanctions, including issuing a reprimand, remedial actions (such as 
requiring the listed company to appoint a compliance adviser), direct a trading suspension68 and 
cancelling the listing.69  In Singapore, for breaches of listing rules generally, until recently, the 
SGX only has the power to issue a reprimand or delist the company in the worst cases of non-
compliance.70 However, in October 2015, the listing rules were amended to allow the SGX to have 
a wider range of enforcement powers, including imposing an administrative fine not exceeding 
S$250,000 or impose restrictions or conditions that the issuers may undertake.71  Additionally, it 
is possible to offer composition of up to S$10,000 for breaches of listing rules that are 
comparatively minor or administrative in nature.72 
 
                                                          
61  The statistics from World Federation of Exchanges, as at December 2015, shows that 37% of the companies 
listed on SGX are foreign companies. In respect of Hong Kong, as at October 2016, only 13% of the companies listed 
on SEHK are incorporated under Hong Kong law. 
62  Securities and Futures Ordinance L.N. 12 of 2003, 1 Apr 2003. 
63  Securities and Futures Act, Cap 289, 2006 rev ed.  
64  See Monetary Authority of Singapore (2016) Capital Markets Enforcement. For the role of the Securities and 
Futures Commission, see http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/about-the-sfc/our-role/, accessed 1 July 2017.  
65  The Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT) imposes civil sanctions on the parties.  
66  See Lam A (2017). 
67  Eg SEHK listing rules, rule 3.08 (GEM listing rules, r 2.06). 
68  SEHK listing rules, rule 2A.09 (GEM listing rules, r 3.10). 
69  SEHK listing rules, rule 2A.08 (GEM listing rules, r 3.09). 
70  Singapore Exchange (2014) Reinforcing the SGX Listings and Enforcement Framework.  
71  SGX listing rules, Chapter 14.  
72  Ibid.   
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2.5.2 Breaches of directorial duties 
 
Appendix 1 summarises the consequences relating to breach of directorial duties. In particular, the 
minority shareholder has the option to take the statutory derivative action and/or pursue the unfair 
prejudice remedy in both jurisdictions. We have included unfair prejudice remedies in our study 
in line with other scholars as petitions often include conduct by directors who are appointed by the 
controlling shareholders.73 Civil and criminal sections are provided, as well as the consequences 
for breach of the criminal provisions.74  
 
2.5.3 Disclosure violations 
 
Appendix 2 summarises the consequences for making of false and misleading statements, and 
failure to make the appropriate disclosure, to the securities markets.75  
 
3 Enforcement of Disclosure Violations and Breaches of Directorial duties in 
Hong Kong and Singapore Markets 
 
3.1 Methodology  
 
We use a combination of case studies as well as hand collect a dataset of cases where enforcement 
proceedings have been taken out against publicly listed companies and/or their directors for 
corporate disclosure violations and breaches of directorial duties (only for directors) during the 
16-year period from 2000-2015. The outcomes of these cases are compiled as at 31 May 2017. We 
choose 2000 as this is shortly after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and this 16-year period covers 
the period pre-and post-global financial crisis of 2007/2008. The relevant legislative provisions 
for contravention are set out in Appendices 1 and 2.  Our sources of information on breaches of 
directorial duties and corporate disclosure violation is from the enforcement actions taken by the 
Commercial Affairs Department (CAD),76 MAS and SFC, which are publicly disclosed, news 
articles from major financial presses and announcements from the firms. As the MAS only 
publishes on its website the enforcement proceedings for a period of the most recent five years, 
we supplement the information from Singapore National Archives website.  
For the regulatory actions undertaken by the stock exchanges, our sources of 
information are the enforcement actions taken by the SEHK and SGX; we include only cases where 
there is a formal disciplinary action (such as a reprimand) and have excluded other cases such as 
stock exchange queries or clarifications. The time period is the seven-year period from 2009 to 
                                                          
73  Other studies including unfair prejudice include Donald DC and Cheuk P (2017). 
74  Appendix 1 does not include the disciplinary sanctions that are imposed by the relevant stock exchanges.  
75  Appendix 2 does not include the sanctions that are imposed by the relevant stock exchanges.  
76  Commercial Affairs Department is the principal law enforcement agency for the investigation of white-collar 
crime in Singapore, including market misconduct.  
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2015 due to data availability; for Singapore, the SGX website only includes the actions since 2009 
and such information is not found in the Singapore National Archives. To ensure comparability, 
we have only included enforcement actions undertaken by SEHK for the period 2009 to 2015. 
Public enforcement actions are also supplemented by judicial decisions reported on 
LexisNexis, Lawnet (Singapore) and Hong Kong Legal Information Institute (Hong Kong) and 
decisions reported by the Market Misconduct Tribunal (MMT). We exclude cases involving 
trading while the company is insolvent and the failure by the directors or controlling shareholders 
in disclosing their interests (or changes thereof) unless such failure is also attributed to the listed 
companies. Each listed company which has been involved in disclosure failure or breaches of 
directorial duties concerning itself or its director is grouped as one case. In other words, where 
separate legal proceedings are taken against the listed company or its director, all the legal 
proceedings are grouped together as one case.  
Private enforcement actions involving breaches of directorial duties and/or corporate 
disclosure cases are obtained from the reported judgments in the case law databases mentioned 
above. Breaches of directorial duties are cases that amount to contraventions of the relevant 
provisions set out in Appendix 1 and duties imposed under the respective stock exchanges’ listing 
rules (in the case of Hong Kong). 77  Corporate disclosure failures are cases that amount to 
contraventions of the relevant provisions set out in Appendix 2 and/or the disclosure obligations 
imposed under the listing rules. We supplement our database of private enforcement actions with 
filings by the listed companies which have announced that they have taken actions against the 
directors for breaches of their duties.   
Our aggregate sample of cases from prosecutions, securities regulator-initiated and 
stock exchange enforcement actions against the listed companies and/or their directors yield a total 
of 115 cases, of which the breakdown between public and private enforcement is set out in Table 
1 below.  
 
Table 1: Classification of cases according to public and private enforcement  
 Hong Kong Singapore 
Type of 
proceedings 
Number of cases  Percentage Number of cases Percentage 
Public enforcement 
only 
71 89.87% 30 83.33% 
Private 
enforcement only 
6 7.59% 4 11.11% 
Both public and 
private 
enforcement 
2 2.53% 2 5.56% 
Total number of 
actions 
79 100% 36 100% 
 
                                                          
77  SEHK listing rules, r 3.08 (GEM listing rules, r 5.01); SGX listing rules, r 135(5). 
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3.2 Analysis of Key findings 
 
3.2.1 Low levels of private enforcement but investor remedies are obtained through 
public enforcement  
 
Based on Table 1, we find that private enforcement is comparatively much lower than public 
enforcement in both countries. 78  Out of the 14 cases involving either private enforcement 
exclusively or an overlap of private and public enforcement, all of them relate to breaches of 
directorial duties. In so far as corporate disclosure violations are concerned, there are no reported 
judgments for damages filed at common law or pursuant to the applicable statutory schemes under 
the SFO79 (in Hong Kong) or the SFA (in Singapore).80  Our study is consistent with what other 
scholars have reported that all the actions instituted for corporate disclosure violations in Hong 
Kong and Singapore has been public enforcement actions.81 
Insofar as the 14 cases are concerned, two cases in Hong Kong82 and one case in 
Singapore83 involve shareholders of a listed company bringing statutory derivative claims against 
the directors or management for breach of directorial duties. Unfair prejudice actions involving 
listed companies are also rare; they comprise four cases: 84  one was brought by a minority 
shareholder of SGX-listed companies (which was successful in the High Court but overturned on 
appeal) in Bermuda;85 two actions were brought in Hong Kong86 and two actions remain pending 
before the Bermuda and Hong Kong courts respectively as at time of writing.87  Six cases involve 
civil proceedings brought by the listed firms against the wrongdoing directors for breaches of 
directorial duties (they are not derivative actions). All of them are actions brought by the 
liquidators of the companies or by the newly constituted boards of directors.  
Table 1 shows that there is little overlap between private litigation and public 
enforcement actions, suggesting that evidence gathered through public enforcement does not lead 
                                                          
78  For a discussion on the landscape of derivative claims in Hong Kong (including involving unlisted 
companies), see Donald DC and Cheuk P (2017) (who also include a discussion on unfair prejudice claims), Mezanotte 
FE (2017).  
79  SFO ss 108, 281, 305, 307Z and 391. 
80  SFA, ss 234 and 236. 
81  See Donald DC (2013) at 74 (Hong Kong); Wan WY (2008). 
82  Tsang Wai Lun Wayland v Grand Field Group Holdings [2009] 3 HKC 81 (statutory derivative action); Hong 
Kong Zhongxing Group Company v Grand Field Group Holdings [2014] HKCU 2729 (statutory derivative action); 
Veron International v RCG Holdings [2015] HKCFI 1246 (statutory derivative action) (unreported). The two Grand 
Field decisions are counted as one case. 
83  Chua Swee Keng v E3 Holdings [2015] SGHC 22.  
84  There is one case on common law unfair prejudice action that was extended to listed companies but we have 
excluded it as it does not deal with breaches of directors’ duties or corporate disclosures: Luck Continent v Cheng 
Chee Tock Theodore [2012] HKEC 567 (Hong Kong). 
85  Kingboard Chemical Holdings v Annuity and Life Reassurance CA 24 of 2015 (Supreme Court, Bermuda). 
86  Passport Special Opportunities v Esun Holdings [2011] 4 HKC 62 (breach of directors’ duties, seeking 
injunction); Able Success Asia v China Packaging Group Company Limited [2014] HKCU 1316 (it was argued that 
an open offer was unfairly prejudicial).   
87  They are In the matter of Full Apex Holdings [2012] SC (Bda) 9 Com (6 February 2012) (on striking out 
action) and In the matter of Bank of East China Holdings HCMP 1812/2016, on file with authors.  
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to private litigation, unlike the situation in the US. 88 The rarity of the private enforcement actions 
against directors may be explained by the difficulties in gathering evidence against the wrongdoing 
directors, even when public regulatory enforcement actions have commenced. Two recent cases 
in Hong Kong and Singapore in our dataset highlight the problems that are faced by new boards 
of directors or liquidators in bringing the actions against the errant directors, particularly those 
involving foreign listings, quite apart from the difficulty of service of proceedings on the errant 
defendants.  The first is Celestial v PWC,89 which involve an S-Chip90 and which has gone into 
liquidation; the auditors refused to allow the liquidators to have access to the papers relating to 
Celestial’s trade dealings, affairs and property, and the  liquidators commenced proceedings to 
demand production of these documents and ultimately prevailed at the appellate level. 91 The 
second is China Shanshui v SFC, where the new board brought an action against the SFC to order 
the discovery of its (China Shanshui’s) own documents in correspondence with the regulators in 
order to establish civil claims against the former directors.92  
Given the fact that there appears to be little private enforcement occurring, the question 
that arises is whether there are any substitutes to enable the listed companies or the shareholders 
to be compensated in the case of contravention? In the next two sub-parts, we explain how public 
enforcement has filled the gap in private enforcement in selected cases. 
Breaches of directorial duties 
In Singapore, at present, there is no power granted to any regulator to enforce breaches of 
directorial duties in order to obtain compensation for the listed company. However, in Hong Kong, 
the gap in private enforcement is partially filled by SFC taking out selected enforcement 
proceedings which have resulted in orders for compensation for investors. Table 2 sets out the list 
of cases, within our sample period, where the SFC has taken out section 213 and/or 214 of the SFO 
proceedings in connection with breaches of directorial duties and were successful in obtaining 
compensation, whether through court orders or settlement proceedings: five involved the payment 
of substantial compensation by the wrongdoing defendants to the listed companies, one requires 
the wrongdoing director to execute a deed of guarantee to procure the recovery of accounts 
receivables owing to the listed company and one is an order for the company to commence civil 
proceedings against the wrongdoing directors.  
Table 2 – Compensation orders or consent orders entered into pursuant to enforcement 
proceedings pursuant to section 213 and/or section 214 of the SFO* 
Listed 
companies 
SFO Year Compensation 
amounts or 
consent/ court 
orders 
Currency Underlying causes of 
action 
                                                          
88  Cf Thompson R and Thomas R (2004) (for US, finding that private suits with parallel SEC proceedings settle 
for significantly more than private suits without such proceedings). 
89  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd [2015] 3 SLR 665. 
90  An S-Chip company is a mainland Chinese private enterprise listed in Singapore, whose operations and assets 
are found in China.  
91  Companies Act, s 285.  
92  China Shanshui Cement Group v Zhang Caikui [2017] HKCU 169.  
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Styland Holdings 
Section 214 2012 
85,950,000 
HKD Breach of directorial 
duties (entering into 
transactions that 
benefitted chairman and 
wife) 
China ASEAN 
Resources 
Section 214 2012 
10,700,000 
HKD Breach of directorial 
duties (payments to third 
party suppliers connected 
to the CEO) 
First China 
Financial 
Network 
Holdings 
Section 214 2015 
18,692,000 
RMB Breach of directorial 
duties (breach of duty of 
care, skill and diligence 
in causing the company 
to pay out monies when it 
was not obliged to do so, 
and thereby indirectly 
benefitting one of the 
directors) 
First Natural 
Food Holdings 
Section 214 2017 
84,880,000 
HKD Breach of director’s 
duties (embezzlement of 
funds)+ 
GOME Electrical 
Appliance 
Holdings 
Section 213 2014 
420,608,765 
HKD Breach of directorial 
duties (causing the 
company to repurchase 
shares held by directors 
without disclosure) 
Rontex 
International 
Holdings 
Section 214 2010 
Ordered company 
to bring civil 
proceedings 
NA Breach of directorial 
duties (breach of the duty 
of care, skill and 
diligence in causing the 
company to enter into 
transactions that result in 
losses to the company) 
Hanergy Thin 
Film Power 
Group 
Section 214  2017 Executive chairman 
executed deed of 
guarantee to 
procure that the 
parent company and 
its affiliates repay 
outstanding 
amounts owing to 
Hanergy  
NA Breach of directorial 
duties on the part of the 
chairman (conflict of 
interests) 
      
 
Source: SFC enforcement news, available at http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/enforcement-news/   
* We exclude from the Table the cases where the SFC has announced that it has commenced section 214 proceedings 
but where the cases are still pending as at 31 May 2017.  
+ While there was a finding that there was false or misleading statement that was issued, no order for compensation 
was made in respect of the market misconduct. 
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We make the following observations. First, insofar as compensation orders for specific 
sums that were made under section 214 shown in Table 2, there is no discount to the provable 
losses arising from the breaches of directorial duties in the cases. The lack of discount is not 
surprising because where there is a dispute as to causation or mitigation of losses, Re Styland 
Holdings has held that the court generally would not make the order for payment of compensation 
under s 214 but direct that the company bring the action.93 Rontex was such a case where the court 
directed the company to bring the action against the errant directors.94  
The outcome relating to the lack of discount stands in contrast with the outcomes of 
class action derivative suits in the US. In the US,95 class action suits incentivise derivative claims 
to be brought by investors against the companies and/or directors.  However, the sums recovered 
in derivative actions are usually strike suits and represent only a small fraction of recovery,96 
though a later study demonstrates that derivative actions have become more important as litigation 
agency costs have been lowered.97 In Hong Kong, although the sample size of successful recovery 
is small, the damages that are ordered are significant and they represent the losses of the listed 
companies (with no discount on provable losses).  
Second, in all of the orders for compensation made against the defendants who are 
directors, these are orders made against the executive directors who are in positions of conflict of 
interests or who have otherwise embezzled company’s funds. Only one case, Rontex International 
Holdings, involved allegations of the lack of care, skill and diligence; this was a case brought 
against executive directors. None of these cases involves independent directors being held liable 
for losses of the company. However, this is not to say that independent directors will escape the 
consequences of their lack of care, skill and diligence; recent public enforcement actions have been 
brought against independent directors by the SFC where the directors face the possibility of 
disqualification.98  
Corporate disclosure violations 
Insofar as matters relating to violations of corporate disclosures are concerned, the lack of private 
enforcement actions has been partially filled by the securities regulator in bringing enforcement 
actions that result in compensation orders being made in Singapore and Hong Kong. The following 
examples set out how the MAS and SFC have secured or attempted to secure investor 
compensation in Singapore and Hong Kong respectively.  
In Singapore, section 326 of the SFA, which is similar to the freezing order under 
section 213 of the SFO, is a powerful tool.  While it is narrower in scope than its Hong Kong 
                                                          
93  See Re Styland Holdings [2012] CFI 312; [2012] 2 HKLRD 325 (the court holding that it would make not 
make compensation losses in respect of certain investments improperly entered into due to issues of causation), para 
142-145.  
94  In the matter of Rontex International Holdings [2010] HKCU 622. 
95  Klausner M (2009); Armour J (2012) at 305. 
96  Romano R (1991). 
97  Thompson R and Thomas R (2004). 
98  WY Wan et al, “Managing the Risks of Corporate Fraud: the Evidence from Hong Kong and Singapore”, 
copy on file with authors.  
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counterpart (see below) as it does not provide for the court to make restoration orders to the 
position prior to the contravention, it is a powerful leverage to get the defendant to negotiate a 
consent order that would benefit the investors indirectly. In China Sky, the MAS first obtained a 
freezing order against the director cum controlling shareholder for breach of sections 199 and 203 
(disclosure violations) in respect of his assets in Singapore.99 In order to resolve the proceedings, 
the defendant agreed to a consent order to pay the civil penalty of S$2.5 million and to surrender 
10% of his shareholdings to the company as compensation for his wrongdoing. 100 Thus, the 
beneficiaries of the surrender of the shares is the company or its existing shareholders. Due to the 
nature of the consent order, investors and shareholders will not be able to separately file statutory 
compensation claims against him.101 The approach of China Sky is similar to that taken in the 
previous case of China Aviation Oil; although it was an insider trading case, the parent company 
of China Aviation Oil engaged in insider trading offered to surrender some of its shareholding 
(that it would receive in a debt equity swap) to compensate the shareholders of China Aviation Oil 
for their losses in connection with the insider trading.102 
In Hong Kong, it is possible for the securities regulator to bring proceedings, on behalf 
of investors, to recover compensation under section 213 and/or 214 of the SFO for contraventions 
of the disclosure obligations. There are two recent instances of the exercise of such power, 
concerning Greencool Technology and CITIC. In Greencool, the SFC obtained an injunction 
against Gu, the former chairman and CEO, of Greencool, in respect of the false and misleading 
financial statements made by Greencool. This injunction is to preserve the assets held for the 
benefit of Gu pending the trial where the SFC is seeking remedial orders for the 1,300 shareholders 
who purchased the Greencool shares when the financial statements were misstated.103 The case 
remains pending as at the date of writing. 
In CITIC, the SFC sought to hold the listed company and its directors liable to pay 
HK$1.9 billion to the 4,500 investors, representing the difference in the price of the shares at which 
the shares were trading when the false or misleading statement was made and when the true 
position was disclosed.104 The case was discontinued when the statements were not demonstrated 
to be false and misleading. However, had the SFC succeeded, the beneficiaries would be the 4,500 
investors (and not the company) and the defendants would be the listed company and its 
                                                          
99  MAS v Huang Zhong Xuan [2013] SGHC 242. 
100  See MAS, “Former China Sky CEO Huang Zhong Xuan pays civil penalty of $2.5 million and offers to 
surrender 10% of his shareholdings in China Sky” (12 February 2015). As for the value of the shares surrendered, it 
is not stated in the press released but based on 15,416,121 shares surrendered and on the average of the closing price 
of China Sky shares for the 3 months prior to the trading suspension on 18 November 2011, the 10% would amount 
to S$1.467 million. 
101  SFA, s 236(1)(b). It is possible, but unlikely, that the plaintiff investors can bring actions at common law 
against the defendant.  
102  MAS, ‘MAS takes civil penalty enforcement action against China Aviation Oil Holding Company for insider 
trading’ (19 August 2005). 
103  Securities and Futures Commission (2014) Court extends freezing injunction against Greencool’s former 
chairman. 
104  Securities and Futures Commission (2014) SFC commences proceedings against CITIC, its former chairman 
and executive directors. See also South China Morning Post (2014) SFC launches legal action against Citic to demand 
compensation for investors. 
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wrongdoing directors. In contrast, as seen in the Singapore’s China Sky example, the beneficiary 
was the company and the defendant was only the wrongdoing director. 
Finally, we offer an explanation why in Singapore, claims for investor compensation 
for false or misleading statement or material non-disclosure remain rare, in spite of the reforms to 
strengthen the private enforcement framework in 2013.105 In 2013, the SFA was amended to 
remove the ceiling of recovery, which had applied to limit the damages to the gains or losses 
avoided by the listed company. Post-amendment, investors can theoretically bring statutory 
compensation actions for losses they incurred (without being constrained by the limitation) if 
reliance can be proven. However, the new requirement of reliance also means that it is significantly 
more difficult to run a class action lawsuit by investors who have traded on the false or misleading 
statement or non-disclosure. In comparison, in US, the fraud on the market theory presumes that 
the market prices reflect all available material information; this facilitates the bringing of securities 
class actions because it obviates the requirement of the plaintiffs to independently prove that they 
have relied on the statements.106 
 
3.2.2 Intensity of public enforcement for breach of directorial duties and corporate 
disclosure violations 
 
Out of the 115 cases in our sample, 105 cases involve public enforcement actions (whether 
exclusively or mix of private and public enforcement actions).  We provide breakdown of the 
public enforcement actions, according to the regulatory agencies, as to whether they involve 
breaches of directorial duties and/or corporate disclosure violations, in Figures 1 and 2. Where a 
case raises both breaches of directorial duties and corporate disclosure cases, we count them 
separately. Thus the total number of actions in Figures 1 and 2 will be more than 105. 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2: Types of public regulatory actions for public 
enforcement] 
Breaches of directorial duties 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the majority of the cases in Hong Kong (52.6%) involving 
breaches of directorial duties (whether exclusively or mixed with corporate disclosure violations) 
are enforced by the SFC via sections 212, 213 and/or 214 of the SFO. Recent cases demonstrate 
that the SFC does take out proceedings pursuant to section 214 of the SFO to disqualify 
independent directors who are reckless or negligent.107 Criminal prosecutions against directors are 
few (three cases) and they involve offences under the Theft Ordinance or conspiracy to defraud on 
                                                          
105  See n 11. 
106  See Basic Inc v Levinson 485 US 224 (1988). It was held that in that case that the class of plaintiffs who had 
traded in securities was not required to show individual reliance on the alleged misstatements. Instead, its reliance on 
public material misrepresentation was presumed, though such presumption was rebuttable. The fraud on the market 
doctrine is premised on the economic theory that is based on the efficient capital markets hypothesis. See Basic Inc v 
Levinson 485 US 224 (1988), 241–42. 
107  WY Wan et al ‘Fraud” (referring to Greencool, AcrossAsia and Hanergy). 
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the part of the executive directors. 108 Out of all of the concluded proceedings brought by the SFC 
involving breach of directorial duties, 13 out of 15 cases involve the imposition of directorial 
disqualification.  Thus, the evidence in Hong Kong is that criminal enforcement involving 
pecuniary penalties or imprisonment is reserved for the most egregious breaches of directorial 
duties. Most of the other cases are brought with a view to disqualify the directors.  
In Singapore, as can be seen in Figure 1, the most common method of enforcing breaches 
of directorial duties (whether exclusively or mixed with corporate disclosure violations) is in the 
form of stock exchange enforcement actions (15 cases). While there were only three criminal 
prosecutions, two cases were brought in connection with breaches of directorial duties for failing 
to act diligently and one involved breach of duties in connection with the prospectus. The former 
two cases had attracted widespread media attention.109 In one of the two cases, the directors 
eventually had their convictions quashed for other reasons. 110  It is significant that the two 
prosecutions involved executive and independent directors; in the case of the latter, they were not 
alleged to have been fraudulent. Thus, the picture is that criminal prosecutions exist but is far less 
prevalent than stock exchange regulatory actions. Though the sample size is small, there is a 
noticeable gap in the enforcement of directorial duties (by comparing the number of criminal 
prosecution and stock exchange enforcement actions).  
Corporate Disclosure Violations 
Insofar as matters relating to corporate disclosure violations (whether exclusively or mixed with 
directorial duties), in Hong Kong, as can be seen in Figure 2, the most common method of 
enforcement is stock exchange enforcement sanction (37 cases), followed by SFC-initiated 
proceedings (29 cases). Between 2003 and 2015 (the end date of our database), out of the SFC-
initiated actions, the SFC has proceeded by way of criminal prosecution under section 386 of the 
SFO (six concluded cases) relating to breaches under section 384 of the SFO relating to the making 
of false or misleading statements.111  Since 2013, when the statutory backing to the disclosure of 
price sensitive information rules come into force, the SFC has brought four cases before the MMT. 
The rest of the SFC-initiated proceedings were brought under section 213 or 214 of the SFO.  
In contrast, in Singapore, as can be seen in Figure 2, the most common method of public 
enforcement is by the stock exchange (18 cases), followed by criminal prosecutions (8 cases) and 
MAS-initiated proceedings for civil penalties (3 cases). For the criminal prosecutions, only three 
cases involve the imposition of custodial sentences and the rest all involve only fines.  
Thus, in Hong Kong, post-2013, there appears to be a preference for the regulators to move away 
from criminal prosecutions and instead enforce via civil sanctions or restorative provisions under 
                                                          
108  Eg HKSAR v Chan Hoi Lam (Climax); HKSAR v Ma Bo Kee and others [2010] HKCFI 2255 (Moulin Global 
Eyecare); HKSAR v Tsang Wai Lung Wayland [2013] 1 HKC 389 (Grand Field)  
109  Eg Chan A (2014). 
110  See Today (2014). 
111  These six cases are brought after the ‘dual-filing’ system came into force in 2003; pursuant to the dual filing 
system, a listed company is required to file with SFC the ongoing disclosure materials issued pursuant to the listing 
rules. Thus, statutory backing is given to the disclosure regime so that SFC can institute proceedings against the listed 
company in respect of the filings made with the SFC. See Chan GYM (2014) n 116. 
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section 213 or 214 of the SFO. In contrast, in Singapore, while the sample size is small, criminal 
prosecutions are more prevalent over civil penalties. The MAS, in determining whether to proceed 
with civil penalty proceedings, has stated that it takes into account a number of factors including 
evidential burden, severity of misconduct, impact on market and whether it delivers a fair and 
proportionate sanction.112 Under the SFA, civil penalties are set higher than the criminal fines,113 
indicating that deterrence remains the central focus. In one case (China Sky), the civil penalty 
which the defendant consented to was S$2.5million,114 which is considerably higher than the 
maximum fine of S$250,000. However, the other two cases on civil proceedings by MAS yield a 
much more modest amount ($75,000) and in another case, a warning.  
3.2.3 Individual and corporate liability  
 
In cases involving corporate disclosure violations, the regulator has the choice between the action 
against the individual corporate official or the listed company or both. We are interested to know 
how the regulator exercises its choices. As such, we only focus on cases that are corporate 
disclosure violations (without regulatory actions being brought for directorial misconduct). Table 
3 set out the public enforcement actions against the companies and/or individuals in the corporate 
disclosure violations only.  
Table 3 Public enforcement actions Against Companies and Individuals for 
Exclusively Corporate Disclosure Violation* 
Panel A – Hong Kong 
 Companies only  Companies and 
individuals 
Individuals only 
Prosecution only 0 0 0 
SFC only 1 9 3 
SEHK only 3 18 0 
Prosecution and 
SFC 
0 0 0 
SFC and SEHK 0 0 0 
Total 4 27 3 
 
Panel B – Singapore 
 Companies only  Companies and 
individuals 
Individuals only 
Prosecution only 0 0 5 
MAS only 1 0 0 
SGX only 3 1 0 
SGX and MAS 1 0 1 
                                                          
112  MAS (2016), para. 7.8. 
113  See Appendix 2 on the civil penalties and criminal fines. 
114  See n 100 above.  
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Other 0 0 1 
Total 5 1 7 
 
* These are cases where regulatory proceedings have been proceeded with against the defendants, and we have 
included both proven and unproven cases. Unproven cases include those where the convictions have been quashed on 
appeal as they indicate the regulatory strategies of the relevant regulator.    
 Here we find similarities between the two jurisdictions in that for criminal prosecutions, 
only the individuals are targeted. This clearly indicates that the predominant objective of criminal 
prosecution is that of deterrence of the individual directors. In particular, in Singapore, in Auston 
v PP, enforcement action was taken out against the company and the individuals involved, and the 
High Court observed that the CEO and CFO were really culpable (and reduced the fine for the 
company).115 The sample size for MAS is small (three cases); one involves a warning (with no 
pecuniary penalty). The more recent case is targeted at the individual only and is likely to indicate 
the trend towards targeting only individuals in Singapore, even for civil penalty cases.116  In 
contrast, the SFC in Hong Kong has proceeded against both the companies and individuals in the 
majority of the cases (9 out of 13 cases).  
 
3.2.4 Other issues of enforcement: sanctions, length of time to resolve  
 
Table 4 sets out the outcomes of public enforcement actions for corporate disclosure actions and 
breaches of directorial duties. Table 5 sets out the length of time the concluded cases take to be 
resolved. In these two tables, we have combined both corporate disclosure actions and breaches of 
directorial duties due to the large overlap of the cases and the fact that in these cases, the regulator 
often has a choice to proceed either with corporate disclosure violation or breach of directorial 
duties. As can be seen in Table 5, the most common sanction is the reprimand and/or bringing 
about governance changes in both jurisdictions. In Hong Kong, the second most common sanction 
is the disqualification order followed by criminal fine/imprisonment. In Singapore, the second 
most common sanction is the criminal fine followed by custodial sentence/disqualification. The 
number of disqualification orders is likely to rise given that the amendments to the statutory 
framework to impose disqualification orders in breaches of the SFA were implemented in 2015.   
On the time taken to resolve the matters, as Table 5 shows, the majority of the public 
enforcement actions concluded within two years from the date of commencement of the 
investigation or discovery of the contravention.117 This would suggest that the plaintiff investors 
should ordinarily not be time-barred and are able to commence proceedings based on the findings 
                                                          
115  [2007] SGHC 219. 
116  This occurred in China Sky where only the defendant director was the subject of MAS enforcement action 
for making false or misleading statement. See n 100. 
117  We have not included 10 cases in Singapore where although there is strong evidence of outright fraud (such 
as misappropriation, outright inaccuracies of accounts) but are unresolved as at end of 2016. All of them are S-Chips 
and it is likely that there are difficulties locating the wrongdoing directors and/or controlling shareholders. 
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of the public enforcement actions. 118 Further, in Singapore, the SGX, in a significant number of 
cases, required the listed company to conduct a special audit to investigate the allegations of 
wrongdoings and ordered that the summary of the special audit reports be published, which can be 
used to support findings of contraventions.119 Yet, when we compare the enforcement proceedings 
in Table 1, there is little overlap between private and public enforcement. Thus, the outcomes in 
Table 5 reinforce the explanation that the lack of overlap is due to the various problems found in 
private enforcement actions listed in Section 2.3 above, including the collective action problem 
and the unfavourable civil procedure rules, and not due to the fact that the public enforcement 
actions take too long to conclude.  
Table 4: Number and Type of Sanctions Imposed for All Cases 
Type of sanctions Hong Kong Singapore 
Reprimand and/or governance 
changes  
35 19 
Custodial sentence 4 3 
Criminal fine  5 5 
Custodial and criminal fine  0 1 
Disqualification+ 14 2 
Winding up of company 1 0 
Civil penalty and disgorgement 1 1 
Others 4 0 
Pending 6 0 
Civil penalty/disgorgement plus 
disqualification 
2 0 
Cases where the action was 
unsuccessful or where convictions 
were imposed but quashed 
subsequently 
1 1 
Total  73 32 
 
 
+We include the cases where the defendants have undertaken not to be a director or in 
management of a listed company, as well as the case where SGX approval is required 
for such appointment.  
 
Table 5: Length of time to resolution for concluded cases (public enforcement) – 
all cases 
 
Panel A: Hong Kong 
                                                          
118  Under s 234 of the SFA, the time-bar to bring the claim for statutory compensation is 6 years from the date 
of completion of the dealing or trading in which the loss occurred.  
119  In our sample, 8 out of 36 Singapore cases (or 22.2%) publish the special audits (or summary thereof).  
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Type of 
regulatory action 
Number of cases  
 Time taken to 
resolution  
2 years or less 
Time taken to 
resolution 3 to 
4 years 
Time taken 
to resolution 
5 to 6 years 
Time 
taken to 
resolution 
more than 
6 years + 
Total 
Prosecution only 0 0 1 3 4 
SFC only 13 5 4 2 24 
SEHK only 32 2 2 0 36 
Prosecution and 
SFC 
1 0 0 0 
1 
SFC and SEHK 0 0 1 1 2 
     67 
 
+We exclude 6 cases which remain pending as at 31 May 2017. 
 
 
Panel B: Singapore  
Type of 
regulatory action 
Number of cases  
 Time taken to 
resolution  
2 years or less 
Time taken to 
resolution 3 to 
4 years 
Time taken 
to resolution 
5 to 6 
years120 
Time 
taken to 
resolution 
more than 
6 years  
Total 
Prosecution only 5 2 1 0 8 
MAS only 1 0 0 0 1 
SGX only 10 2 0 0 12 
SGX and MAS 2 0 0 0 2 
Other 0 0 0 1 1 
     24 
 
+We exclude 8 cases which remain pending as at 31 May 2017. 
4 Other functional substitutes for private enforcement: shareholder engagement 
and requisitions 
 
                                                          
120  Under s 234 of the SFA, the time-bar to bring the claim for statutory compensation is 6 years from the date 
of completion of the dealing or trading in which the loss occurred.  
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Our findings prompt the question as to whether there are other methods in which dissatisfied 
shareholders or investors can enforce their rights where they are displeased with governance 
failures.  Armour et al found that shareholder governance rights serve as substitutes for civil 
enforcement in the UK.121 A recent study shows that institutional shareholders are active sponsors 
of shareholder proposals in the UK.122 Do the same results hold in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
which are characterised by concentrated shareholdings? We focus in particular on the requirement 
that shareholders owning at least 10% (Singapore companies), 5% (Hong Kong companies) or 
their equivalents for foreign companies can call for the directors to convene a shareholders’ 
meeting.123  
We have assembled our database of shareholder requisitions that are filed in 
connection with publicly listed companies during the 2008-2015 period. Our dataset is assembled 
on the basis of availability of filings on the websites of the SEHK, SGX and major financial press. 
On the websites of SEHK and SGX, we specifically searched for “requisition”, and “shareholder 
resolution”. We have the data for 2008-2015 for Hong Kong from SEHK’s website. For SGX-
listed companies, the SGX’s website only retains the data from 2012 (five years). To assemble the 
data between 2008 and 2011, we obtained an index of filings from SGX and searched for the same 
key words, and then manually assembled the database on the contents from the major financial 
press.  
Our dataset yields 84 shareholder requisitions filed during the relevant period. We 
exclude 26 from our analysis on the basis of incomplete information and a special case which was 
instigated by SFC.124 We then identify which are linked to governance failures, that is, where the 
shareholders have complained that the directors have been in breach of their duties or involved 
fraud investigations. We collect information on the shareholdings of the requisitioning 
shareholders and whether they are the largest shareholders in the company based on the 
information in the requisition notices and annual reports.  
Table 6: number of shareholder requisitions and the number which are related to 
governance failures: 
 
 Hong Kong Singapore 
                                                          
121  Armour J et al. (2009).  
122  Buchanan B et al. (2012). 
123  Companies Act, s 176 (Singapore); Companies Ordinance, ss 566-568 (Hong Kong). Further in Singapore, 
shareholders holding at least 10% of the shares can call the meeting themselves: Companies Act, s 177. For foreign 
listed companies listed on SEHK, the SEHK requires that the articles of association of these companies should provide 
for similar requirements for the shareholders to requisition the meetings: see Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing 
Limited (2016) Guide on General Meetings. The court will not intervene to prevent the shareholders from exercising 
such rights: see e.g. China Investment Fund Company v Guang Sheng Investment (CFI, HCA 411/2016). The 
constitution or articles of association of the company cannot limit the ability of shareholders to call for the meetings: 
Companies Act, s 176. 
124  This related to GOME, where as part of the settlement of the SFC proceedings, the wrongdoing directors 
cum shareholders would seek to requisition a shareholders’ meeting.  
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 Number of 
requisitions 
Of which, 
governance related 
Number of 
requisitions 
Of which, 
governance 
related 
2008 1 0 3 3 
2009 0 0 6 1 
2010 2 0 2 0 
2011 2 1 4 2 
2012 3 2 2 0 
2013 4 2 3 1 
2014 5 0 1 0 
2015 16 4 4 2 
 33 9 25 9 
 
Here, we find some evidence that in Hong Kong and Singapore, minority shareholders who are 
unhappy with the directors over governance failures do file requisitions to seek to remove directors 
and/or seek other relief (such as appointment of independent advisers). This occurred in Hong 
Kong (9 out of the 33 cases) and Singapore (9 of the 25 cases). Their shareholdings range from 
12% to 42% (Hong Kong) and 11.1% to 25% (Singapore), and in 5 of these cases, these 
requisitioning shareholders are not the largest shareholders (which suggest that they will fail 
anyway). Thus, although our sample size is small, the evidence suggests that there are shareholders 
concerned about corporate governance and are willing to seek governance changes.125  
Considering that minority shareholders still file requisitions even though they are not 
likely to succeed, we suggest that the reasons such filings could be due to their extra-legal forces, 
particularly from the perspective of exerting reputational pressure. Directors and/or controlling 
shareholders who are criticized for their corporate governance failings in breaches of directorial 
duties or not treating minority shareholders fairly could face a negative impact on their reputation, 
undermining their standing in the business community.126  Our survey of the governance-linked 
requisitions show that they do criticize the decision making of directors or highlight their less than 
exemplary behaviour. Our findings contrast with the assertions of the lack of an activist culture 
among shareholders in Hong Kong and Singapore.127 
  
5 Lessons and Normative implications  
 
5.1 Deterrence: the case for securities regulator to enforce directorial duties in Singapore 
 
                                                          
125  Our study does not include the shareholders who have engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations. There is 
evidence that such negotiations do take place and only engage in open confrontation when these negotiations break 
down: see Wong FMK (2017) (for Hong Kong).  
126  See Coffee JC (2011) (arguing that social norms do matter and constrain controlling shareholders). 
127  See Lan LL and Varottil U (2015); cf Wong FMK (2017). 
 29 
 
 
Our findings reveal a gap between the law in action and law in the books for breaches of directorial 
duties in Singapore. Shareholder derivative action and unfair prejudice actions are rare in 
Singapore and while shareholders do exert their governance rights by filing requisitions to remove 
directors linked to governance failures, there are important limitations, as demonstrated in Section 
4. First, they can only do so if they (or if they assemble fellow shareholders) hold the requisite 
percentage of shareholding (at least 10% in Singapore,  and 5% in Hong Kong). Second, the 
requisitioning shareholders’ bargaining power is somewhat limited vis a vis the controlling 
shareholders, though not negligible, as the requisitioning shareholders rely on exerting pressure 
through reputational concerns. However, reputational concerns are unlikely to be sufficient in 
themselves to incentivize shareholders to make such filings.  
  Table 1 shows that many breaches of directorial duties (as evidenced by stock 
exchange reprimands) are often not enforced by private enforcement. Where there is no new board 
of directors or if the company is in liquidation but the liquidators are unwilling to bring the action 
possibly due to lack of funds or where the directors are not able to fulfil any judgment made against 
them, there is little prospect of shareholders bringing private enforcement actions. As outlined in 
Section 2, shareholders are deterred by the general procedural hurdles relating to the lack of class 
actions, the unavailability of contingency fees, the presence of the rule that the loser pays the 
winner costs and an unfavourable discovery regime.128 Further, we find that discovery disputes are 
common and even the new boards or liquidators face uphill tasks, particularly if the wrongdoing 
directors have destroyed or otherwise do not make available the documents. 129   When the 
defendant directors are located outside Singapore, the litigation costs in bringing these actions 
become even larger and substantial delay is likely to result.  
In contrast, in Hong Kong, while the general procedural hurdles to private enforcement 
are also similar to Singapore, the problem is ameliorated by the fact that the SFC has exercised its 
powers under section 213 and/or 214 of the SFO to obtain compensation for the investors in 
connection with breaches of directorial duties. The availability of the broad freezing orders taken 
out by the securities regulator also means that the likelihood of obtaining an early settlement is 
much higher. For example, successful settlement in GOME (Hong Kong), Greencool (Hong Kong) 
and China Sky (Singapore),130 all involve cooperation from the mainland authorities, which had 
taken out freezing orders.  
We argue that in Singapore there is a need for a securities regulator to enforce directorial 
duties in the case of public listed companies, with the ability to bring about civil penalties for the 
following reasons. 131  First, using only exclusively criminal sanctions are blunt tools for 
enforcement. As we have seen, the public prosecutor in Singapore can and does bring criminal 
actions in connection with breach of directorial duties, even in cases where the directors have been 
only reckless or negligent (as opposed to outright fraud). These actions focus on the deterrent effect 
of the enforcement actions as the sanction includes imprisonment, fine and/or disqualification. 
However, the powers to bring criminal actions against independent directors are only rarely 
exercised.  
                                                          
128  Loke A (2009). 
129  E.g. discussion in n 89 above. 
130  See discussion in Section 3.2.1. 
131  See discussion in Liau T (2014). 
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Second, as explained in Section 2.2 above, a civil penalty order will allow the court to 
calibrate the appropriate sanction in respect of the contravention, particularly since the breach of 
directorial duties cover a very wide range, involving classic fraud or conflict of duties, but also 
negligence.  We have seen that the regulator uses the tools of criminal prosecutions and civil 
penalty orders to calibrate the punishment in connection with corporate disclosure violations and 
there is no reason why the full range of tools cannot be used in directorial disqualification cases. 
Third, we are of the view that it may be unnecessary for the statutory regime to include 
an express power for the securities regulator to seek compensation for the listed company, and it 
is sufficient to include a civil penalty provision. Having an express power to seek compensation 
for the listed company may result in the investing public’s expectation that such powers will often 
be exercised. A shareholder would also not know whether or not the regulator would exercise the 
power. Also breaches of directorial duties cover a wide range and it is best left to the listed 
company to make an assessment whether to pursue the action. The civil penalty provision will 
incentivize the wrongdoing directors to negotiate with the securities regulator to pay compensation 
to the company (particularly when there is a freezing order in place under section 326 of the SFA). 
The experience with China Sky in connection with corporate disclosure violations has shown that 
such incentives do exist.132 Thus, the securities regulator, by having the jurisdiction to bring civil 
penalty orders against the wrongdoing director, can indirectly obtain compensation for the listed 
company.  
 
5.2 Individual and corporate claims and liability for corporate disclosure violations and 
the circularity problem 
 
In Section 3, we demonstrate that the securities regulator does exercise its powers to benefit the 
investors for corporate disclosure violations. However, two questions remain. First, should the 
listed company or individual investors be able to recover for corporate disclosure violations? 
Second, these actions be brought against the listed companies or individual directors? In Singapore 
and Hong Kong, given that it is the regulatory authorities (rather than the plaintiff investors) who 
are significant in bringing actions that can lead to compensation, they can influence or determine 
whether it is the listed company or the investors that should be compensated in the course of 
exercising their regulatory powers. The choice of the appropriate plaintiffs and defendants bring 
to forefront the circularity problem in securities litigation, as outlined above.   
In Singapore, notwithstanding the law in the books, public enforcement favours 
individual liability rather than corporate liability; the exception is stock exchange reprimands 
which currently do not carry pecuniary losses. Insofar as investor compensation is concerned, it is 
possible for the individual wrongdoers to offer to pay compensation to the listed company in order 
to reduce their potential liabilities for the civil pecuniary orders (as in the case of China Sky). The 
Singapore approach suggests that the key driver for private enforcement of corporate disclosure 
violation is deterrence, and investor compensation is only secondary for the following reasons:133 
                                                          
132  See n 100 and accompanying text.  
133  In a different context, Tjio H has argued that the purpose of enforcing corporate disclosure is to further 
corporate governance, rather than investor protection: Tjio H (2009). 
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it is inconsistent with investor compensation rationale to benefit the listed company. The 
circularity problem falls away because it is the wrongdoing individual directors who end up being 
liable. Such an approach can be justified: for misstatements or failure to disclose material 
information in the secondary market, the listed company (and its existing shareholders) usually 
would not have benefitted at the expense of the plaintiff investors.134   
In Hong Kong, listed companies and individuals are targeted with civil penalties for 
disclosure cases. Insofar as compensation is concerned, the SFC have brought these actions against 
both the listed companies and individuals as the defendants in the course of seeking substantial 
compensation orders in favour of the investors who have invested in the securities when the false 
or misleading statements were in force (or during the period when the disclosure of material 
information should be but was not made) (in the case of CITIC). Thus, the key driver for enforcing 
corporate disclosure violation is investor compensation.  
Our analysis shows that there are variations even in how the securities regulator can 
obtain compensation for investors, whether directly or indirectly, even in two markets which are 
similar in many respects. On balance, we argue that the principal driver for public enforcement 
should be deterrence and furtherance of corporate governance and in this respect, the Singapore 
approach in making only the wrongdoing individuals as defendants in enforcement proceedings 
and paying substantial compensation has its merits. While it could be argued that Directors 
Officers (D&O) insurance may step in, rendering much of the deterrence nugatory, D&O insurance 
will not cover fraud cases. 135Directors and senior managers are also deterred from wrongdoing 
when the risk of paying substantial damages fall on them.  
In Singapore, however, having the listed company as the beneficiary is over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive at the same time; benefiting the existing shareholders of the company means 
that shareholders who have been shareholders of the company as at the time of the misleading 
statement was made will benefit, even though they have not made any trading decisions in reliance 
of such statement. On the other hand, investors who have bought into the company during the 
currency of the false and misleading statement but subsequently sold the shares when the statement 
is corrected will not be compensated since they cease to be shareholders of the company.  
In Hong Kong, while the investors directly receive the benefits of compensation, a 
position that is close to that in the UK (as seen in the Tesco litigation), 136 the securities regulator 
has sought to hold both the listed company and the wrongdoing directors liable. Holding the listed 
company liable will ensure that recovery to investors is more assured. However, it penalises the 
shareholders who have not participated in the wrongdoing. It could be argued that the listed 
company can subsequently recover the damages from the wrongdoing directors for breach of 
duties, we have seen that private enforcement by the listed company is rare unless there is a new 
board of directors or the company is in liquidation.  Relying on investor compensation as part of 
public enforcement also has the drawback; regulators necessarily have to be selective in the cases 
that they choose to enforce due to budgetary constraints.  
The lack of private enforcement demands a relook at the procedural rules on how private 
enforcement is conducted. For example, procedural rules on discovery can be facilitated. In Hong 
                                                          
134  See Wan WY (2009). 
135  Ibid. 
136  See n 39. 
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Kong, in a recent case, the SFC did not object to the new board of a company demanding discovery 
of documents that are no longer in the possession of the new board.137  Looking at the number of 
stock exchange reprimands in both countries, it can be seen that the majority of corporate 
disclosure violations are not the subject of subsequent enforcement actions by the MAS or SFC 
which carries pecuniary sanctions or investor compensation. 
We turn to criminal and civil penalty sanctions, where the circularity problem does not 
apply and the sole question is whether liability should fall on the listed company and/or the 
wrongdoer directors. Does corporate criminal liability or civil penalty sanctions offer any valuable 
tool? We argue that the primary purpose in this case is deterrence and deterrence is fulfilled in the 
two respects. First, it is used as a deterrence, which is the principal goal in imposing criminal 
liability and civil sanctions. In the case of civil sanctions, it is possible to calibrate the deterrence 
level but not setting too high a pecuniary penalty. Second, while stock exchange reprimands on 
listed companies have required firms to reform their internal controls and compliance programmes, 
corporate liability for civil penalties will provide further incentives to set up proper programmes. 
In sum, in Singapore, greater consideration should be given to enforcing civil sanctions against the 
listed companies as well, and not merely on the directors.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Despite the law in books in enhancing investor access to compensation through the availability of 
statutory derivative actions, public enforcement of corporate and securities laws in Hong Kong is 
much more central than private enforcement. The same picture can be seen in Singapore. In spite 
of the availability of statutory derivative action and easier access to the statutory compensation 
scheme, almost all of the enforcement actions take place through public enforcement; private 
enforcement is rare, save in the case of directorial duties where there are new boards of directors 
or liquidators. However, in both jurisdictions, investor compensation is not completely ignored, as 
can be seen by the actions taken by securities regulator for the benefit of the investors. We have 
also seen functional substitutes in the form of shareholder requisitions filed by minority 
shareholders holding significant stakes. The Hong Kong and Singapore examples show that 
increasing the accessibility of remedies will not mean that shareholders will necessarily exercise 
these powers.  
Our results show that in spite of the existence of robust public enforcement, there are 
gaps between law in books and law in action. In Singapore, while the substantive law for breaches 
of directorial duties is strong, there is a noticeable gap in the enforcement of breaches of directorial 
duties (as evidenced from the facts surrounding the stock exchange reprimands in Singapore) and 
obtaining compensation for the listed company. The reason for the gap lies in the regulator not 
having the important option of bringing civil penalty proceedings on directorial duties and is 
restricted only to criminal proceedings.   
                                                          
137  See discussion in n 92 above. 
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Our results also show that there are differences in the securities regulator in both 
countries in seeking to obtain investor compensation for corporate disclosure violation, both in 
respect of the beneficiaries of compensation and the defendants. We argue that when the securities 
regulator exercises its powers to obtain compensation, the proper beneficiary should be the 
investors, and the proper defendants should be the wrongdoing directors. Even if the wrongdoing 
directors are insiders and are controlling shareholders, their payment of compensation would 
exceed any benefits that they obtain by reason of their shareholdings. Finally, we argue that 
deterrence should be the main driver in imposing criminal or civil sanctions. 
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Figure 1 – Enforcement Agency for Breach of Directorial duties in Hong Kong 
and Singapore 
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Figure 2 – Enforcement Agency by Breach of Disclosure Obligations in Hong 
Kong and Singapore 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix1 
Civil and criminal Consequences Upon Breach of Directors’ Duties* 
 Civil section Civil remedies Unfair 
prejudice 
Legislative 
provision making 
it a criminal 
offence 
Criminal 
sanction 
Civil 
penalty 
orders 
Disqualification 
of director 
Statutory 
compensation 
Singapore+ Section 157 of 
Companies Act 
(act honestly 
and use 
reasonable 
diligence) and 
common law   
Compensation, 
account of 
profits for 
breach of 
directors’ 
duties taken by 
company 
(whether by 
company or by 
shareholders 
derivative 
action); 
section 157 of 
Companies 
Act 
Section 216 
of the 
Companies 
Act 
Section 157 of 
Companies Act 
(act honestly and 
use reasonable 
diligence) 
Fine up to 
S$5,000 
and/or 
imprisonment 
up to 12 
months 
NA Yes None 
Singapore NA NA NA Penal Code 
(misappropriation, 
theft, criminal 
breach of trust) 
Various 
sanctions 
prescribed 
under the 
Penal Code 
NA NA NA 
Hong Kong Section 465 of 
Companies 
Ordinance 
(exercise 
reasonable care, 
skill and 
Compensation, 
account of 
profits for 
breach of 
directors’ 
duties  
Sections 724 
and/or 725 
Companies 
Ordinance 
2012; 
previously 
section 168A 
NA NA NA Yes, as orders 
made under 
section 214 of 
the SFO 
Yes, orders 
under sections 
213 and/or 214 
of SFO 
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diligence) and 
common law 
(whether by 
company or by 
shareholders 
in derivative 
action); 
section 466 of 
Companies 
Ordinance  
of the 
Companies 
Ordinance& 
 
* The table does not include provisions relating to the breaches of directors’ duties when the company is insolvent.    
+ The application of the Companies Act provisions in this table (that is, section 157 and 216) only applies to Singapore-incorporated companies.  
& Sections 724 and 725 apply to both Hong Kong companies and non-Hong Kong companies (defined as companies incorporated outside Hong Kong but 
establish a place of business in Hong Kong).  
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Appendix 2  
Civil and Criminal Consequences Upon the Making of False and Misleading Statements to the Securities Market 
 
 Civil action Civil remedies Contravention section Criminal sanction Civil 
penalt
y 
orders 
Disqualificatio
n of director 
Statutory 
compensation 
(upon breach)  
Singapor
e 
Misrepresentation 
at common law; 
tort of deceit; 
negligent 
misstatement 
Remedies for 
misrepresentation at 
common law 
Section 199 of SFA 
(making false or 
misleading statements) 
Section 204 of SFA: 
Fine up to S$250,000 
and/or imprisonment 
up to 7 years 
Sectio
n 232 
of 
SFA: 
$2 
million 
or 3 
times 
the 
benefit 
gained 
Yes, if 
conviction is 
after 1 July 
2015 
Sections 234 and 
236 of SFA (for 
breach of section 
199) 
   Section 200 of SFA 
(fraudulently inducing 
persons to deal in 
securities) 
Section 204 of SFA: 
Fine up to S$250,000 
and/or imprisonment 
up to 7 years 
Sectio
n 232 
of 
SFA: 
$2 
million 
or 3 
times 
the 
benefit 
gained 
Yes, if 
conviction is 
after 1 July 
2015 
Sections 234 and 
236 of SFA (for 
breach of section 
200) 
 For prospectuses, 
in addition to the 
common law, 
there are specific 
statutory civil 
claims that may 
be brought 
against various 
defendants, 
Remedies for misleading 
or non-disclosure in the 
prospectus 
Section 254 of the SFA  Section 253 of the 
SFA: Fine up to 
S$150,000 and/or 
imprisonment up to 2 
years; and up to 
S$15,000 per day for 
continuing offence 
NA NA Section 254 of 
SFA 
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including the 
company and its 
directors. 
        
Hong 
Kong 
Misrepresentation
; tort of deceit; 
negligent 
misstatement 
 Remedies for 
misrepresentatio
n  
 
 
 
 Section 108 of 
SFO (civil 
liability for 
inducing 
persons to 
invest in 
securities) 
 Section 277 of 
SFO (disclose 
false or 
misleading 
statement 
likely to 
induce 
transaction) 
 Section 391 
(false or 
misleading 
public 
communicatio
n concerning 
securities) 
 Section 107 
of SFO 
(criminal 
liability of 
inducing 
persons to 
invest in 
securities) 
None Yes, orders 
under section 
213 and/or 214 
of SFO 
 Section 
108 
(civil 
liability
)  
 
 Section 
281 
(for 
breach 
of 
section 
277) 
 
 Section 
391 
(civil 
liability
)  
   Section 298 of SFO 
(disclose false or 
misleading statement 
inducing transaction) 
Section 303 of SFO : 
Fine up to HK$10 
million and/or 
imprisonment up to 
10 years 
None  Section 305 of 
SFO (breach of 
section 298)  
   Section 384 of SFO 
(provision of false or 
misleading statement 
under a requirement 
imposed in SFO to 
SFC and/or SEHK) 
Section 384: Fine up 
to HK$500,000 
and/or imprisonment 
up to 6 months 
   
 For prospectuses, 
in addition to 
common law and 
Remedies for false or 
misleading provisions in 
prospectus or non-
Sections 40(1) and 
342E of Companies 
(Winding up and 
 Sections 
40A and 
342F of 
None NA Sections 40(1) 
and 342E of 
CWMPO 
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sections 108, 277, 
281 and 391 of 
SFO) there are 
specific statutory 
civil claims that 
may be brought 
against the issuer 
and its directors 
compliance with 
prospectus requirements 
by persons who acquire 
shares in primary market  
Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Ordinance 
(CWUMPO), Cap 32 
(for false and 
misleading disclosure);  
CWUMPO 
(for 
misleading 
disclosure): 
Imprisonmen
t or fine 
 Sections 38 
and 342 of 
CWUMPO) 
(for non-
compliance 
with 
prospectus 
requirements
) 
 Fraud Compensatory damages Section 16A of Theft 
Ordinance (person who 
by any deceit and with 
intent to defraud 
induces a person to 
commit an act (or not 
commit an act) which 
results in benefit to 
anyone else or in 
prejudice or a 
substantial risk of 
prejudice to another 
person 
Offence: 
Imprisonment of up 
to 14 years 
NA NA NA 
 Theft Compensatory damages Section 21 of Theft 
Ordinance (officer of a 
company, with intent to 
deceive the 
shareholders or 
creditors about the 
affairs of the company, 
to publish or agree to 
publish any written 
representation or 
account which to his 
knowledge is or may 
Imprisonment of up 
to 10 years 
NA NA NA 
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be misleading, false or 
deceptive in a material 
matter) 
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Criminal and Civil Consequences Upon Violation of the Continuous Disclosure Obligations 
 Civil action Civil 
remedies 
Legislation 
imposing 
obligation on 
listed 
company on 
continuous 
disclosure 
Criminal 
sanction 
Civil 
penalty 
orders 
Disqualification 
(of director) 
Statutory 
compensation 
Singapore Limited Limited Section 203 
of SFA  
(criminal 
sanction 
only applies 
if the breach 
is intentional 
or reckless, 
otherwise, 
negligent 
breach only 
attracts civil 
liability)  
Section 204 
of SFA: Fine 
up to 
S$250,000 
and/or 
imprisonment 
up to 7 years 
Section 
232 of 
SFA: S$2 
million or 
3 times the 
benefit 
gained 
Yes, if 
conviction is 
after 1 July 2015 
Sections 234 and 
236 of SFA (for 
breach of section 
203) 
Hong Kong Limited  Limited Section 
307B of 
SFO 
NA Section 
307N of 
the SFO: 
Fine not 
exceeding 
HK$8 
million  
Yes, section 
307N: not 
exceeding 5 
years  
 
 
Section 307Z 
(for breach of 
disclosure 
requirement) 
 
Section 213 
and/or section 
214 of SFO 
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